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2002   

Drawn to the asylum: in search of missing parts 

(on the way to a possible conversation)

 By Judith E. Vida, M.D. © 2000, 2001, 2002

Presented to the Academy for the Study of the Psychoanalytic Arts and the Michigan Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology, Providence Hospital , Detroit Michigan , September 8, 2002 , 11:30 AM .  Earlier versions were presented as a public lecture at the UCLA/Armand Hammer Museum, in conjunction with the exhibition “The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock”, September 7, 2000, 7 PM, and to the Department of Psychology, Haifa University, Haifa, Israel, Wednesday, November 28, 2001, 8 PM.

Acknowledgments: I give deep appreciation to Linda Young of the Academy and Etta Saxe of the Society whose irresistible invitation and tireless efforts enabled me to come; to Terri Egan, who created a brochure for this program that is every presenter’s dream-come-true; to Pat and Linda Kavanaugh, who define what it is to be a friend; and to Stuart Spence, without whose technical support (and every other kind of support, too) I couldn’t do this.

This lecture is dedicated to the memory of Lawton H. Smith, Ph.D. (1940-2000), who through no desire of his own or mine has become a “missing part.”

Between 1918 and 1921 the German art historian and psychiatrist Dr. Hans Prinzhorn (1886-1933), assembled a collection of some 5000 works, paintings, drawings, manuscripts, objects, and collages made by the patients of psychiatric institutions in Europe over the preceding forty years.  This act made visible an attitude that seemed to be changing, at least for a while, toward individuals who had long been considered not quite human.  Although early on the Collection attracted the attention of such artists such as Paul Klee and Oskar Schlemmer, Prinzhorn himself seemed to lose interest in it by the mid-1920s.  “[I]t was little visited and, under the unpropitious climate of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, it fell into neglect.  Only in recent decades has it been properly catalogued and restored, and made available for a broader public.” (Beyond Reason, p. 5)

Partly because of lectures that I have given about art and artists, for example, on Yayoi Kusama, who lives voluntarily on the grounds of a psychiatric hospital in Japan, and others, I was invited by David Rodes, Director of the Grunwald Center for the Graphic Arts, to be part of the public program developed by the UCLA/Hammer Museum to honor an exhibition of drawings from the Prinzhorn Collection.  Although I am a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst by profession, I did not profess to speak then (nor will I today) as either one, but simply as a person for whom those experiences form a part of my identity. I am not going to talk about that exhibition of these drawings, in terms of  “their importance for the study of mental illness.”  I am also not going to speak about the value of that exhibition, or these drawings, as art (that is, as Art with a capital-letter A). I’m not myself either interested or particularly qualified to enter into the politics of regarding the Prinzhorn collection either as Art or as not-Art, or in terms of any other dichotomized system---insane or not-insane, genius or not-genius, perhaps even good or bad.

Michael Parsons reminds us that those in the social and natural sciences know very well “that concepts which may seem like objective descriptions of reality are in fact socially and historically constructed ” (2000, p. 38). There are knowledgeable professionals who are qualified to address the issues of social and historical construction and who can give us--- you, and me--- their reasons why we should have gone to that exhibition, why we should want to have seen it, and what it was we were meant to find, what it was we were meant to think it was about. I think it could be useful for us to look at some of the things these professionals have to say. It may be a little bit boring, as I read out a few things from catalog essays about this work, but that way we will know something of the existing territory, how others are framing it, so to speak.  Let us think of this as a kind of “homework.” Perhaps the knowledge that we have “done our homework” will make us free to go out and play, to go on to something else, to find another way of looking. And of course, there is another level of questioning now, which touches why I have chosen this lecture to give you today, and why you are here listening to me. (cycle through basic Prinzhorn slides, Carousel II --- not Clemens van Oertzen)

In the catalog that accompanied the exhibition, The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock, Catherine de Zegher, Director of the Drawing Center in New York where the exhibition originated, tells us that these “legendary and influential…works…[are]…astounding for their intensity and beauty”, and adds that “[b]y the end of the nineteenth century, the art of the insane represented not only the lost world of childhood, but also the burgeoning  force of the utopia of aesthetic experimentation, which characterizes the beginnings of the avant-garde.” (p. 3)

Hal Foster, in his essay, invites us to think historically about “the art of the insane” as “expression”, as “vision”, as “transgression”, and as “regression”, as he looks at what this work meant to Hans Prinzhorn (the German psychiatrist who collected these works in his professional capacity), and to Paul Klee, Jean Dubuffet, and Max Ernst, artists whose bodies of work were substantially influenced by this exposure. 

In his essay “The Mad as Artists”, Sander Gilman presents the continuum of thought about art and insanity which has stretched across the twentieth century (and into the twenty-first), a continuum ranging from the romantic notion of the madman who by virtue of madness possesses an exemplary creative vision, to the politically-motivated extirpation of art and artists whose unconventionality makes them dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society.  

Allen S. Weiss selects several pieces from the exhibition to muse upon “the primal sources” of image and word in the Prinzhorn drawings, and offers connections to specific contemporary examples in both art and popular culture. 

Finally, Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger borrows Lacan’s way of thinking to contrast the Freudian concept of “the symptom”, as the expression of defect or damage which is magically its own disavowal, with Lacan’s notion of “the sinthome”, an entity which in its embodiment of damage looks at the damage and in looking transcends it. [An interesting example of a “sinthome” can be found, I think, in the popular film from a few years ago, The Full Monty, in which a group of men stripped of their dignity by chronic joblessness struggle to regain some wholeness by becoming male strippers.]  

In Beyond Reason: Art and Psychosis, the catalog that accompanies the Prinzhorn Collection as a whole, there is an essay that provides a detailed history of the origin and development of the collection. Then, Dr. Inge Jadi, the psychiatrist who has been the Chief Curator of the Collection for nearly 20 years faces squarely the problem created by the aesthetic dimension of the works in the collection. “There is talk,” she writes,

“…of the refractory element in art; this refers to the fact that although it is possible to think, talk, and argue about art, art itself refuses discursivity and social emancipation.  It is made exclusively for its own sake, an existential gift, bearing knowledge.  But psychiatric institutions and their instrumental activities are directed at communication. And so works of art created by patients out of inner necessity, and with no ulterior purpose, are treated in psychiatric thinking as if they were communication, and significance is attributed to them.  This fails to take account of the fact that every artistic activity on a patient’s part is an act that creates meaning as a way of countering the existence-threatening erosion of meaning by the psychosis. A work of art is a building-block of its creator’s specific world, the presentation of a selfhood.  To grasp such entities requires a cognitive ability that can be developed only through intercourse with art.”  

Dr. Jadi says further that “Psychosis itself is indescribable, indivisible, and not open to analytical understanding”, a statement with which not all psychoanalysts would agree.  “But,” she continues, “artistic expressions by those affected, other than mere expressions of defence mechanisms, arise from the periphery of core psychotic events, and make it possible for us to come closer to them (p. 31).” This is a statement with which many of us would agree.  

And in an interesting way, Dr. Jadi draws some distinctions about art-as-therapy:

“In the therapeutic context, this is the role of art-centred therapy, in which art and music therapists draw on their own artistic experience and are thus in a position to accompany the patient’s productions actively within the medium, showing sympathy and professional knowledge of the appropriate formal laws.  No communication takes place here: art does not convey significance in a mediatory sense. It leads to encounters that make patients feel understood.  This affords a shelter that enables them to establish a new order for their world-view, which has collapsed amid the uncertainties of the psychosis, and thereby stabilize themselves (p. 31).”

Jadi  uses “communication” here in an interesting way,  seeming to suggest that “communication” is "meaning" that travels in one direction only, from the art work to the viewer.  She does not construe “communication” as a dialogue, and she does not construe the pursuit of understanding (of oneself or of another) as “communication.”

In the final essay in the catalogue, Caroline Douglas speaks with a touching and powerful lucidity of the unresolvable conundrums.  She examines Victor Tausk’s important 1919 psychoanalytic paper  “On the origin of the influencing machine in schizophrenia” to focus on Tausk’s highly original understanding, that the “influencing machine” is a projection on to the outside world of the patient’s genitalia. (A further element of the projection, in fact, which she does not address, is that the patient experiences his whole person as the genital). This projection takes place because of the patient’s virtually complete collapse of ego boundaries. The notion of the loss of ego boundaries in schizophrenia was Tausk’s great contribution. It is this loss of ego boundaries, she writes, that “undermines to some extent the validity of the appropriation of the image of insanity to the self-image of the artist, who seeks thereby an intensification of his own individuality…The spontaneous act of creation, whether writing, drawing, sculpting, or embroidering…[is]…an assertion of selfhood in itself, and as such is to be distinguished from the practice of art therapy (p. 45).” What she is pointing at is that the romantic idea of the artist as a madman who uses insanity to intensify his experience of selfhood is fundamentally untenable.  Selfhood, she insists, is essential to the creation of art. 

I want to borrow Douglas ’ elegant conclusion as a bridge back to what it is I am here to say.  “Setting aside any romantic notions,” she says,

“…and aware of the terrible suffering  that always accompanies mental illness, we can still appreciate the works of Prinzhorn’s masters as a new view of reality, born out of extremes of emotion and experience.  It is impossible to approach these works of art via the accepted canon of art history, to situate them within artistic movements or unpick influences and intellectual trends.  The works are presented together, yet the artists could not have been further from being a cohesive group.  They simply do not fit, yet their influence pervades the art history of the century.  As is perhaps fitting for an illness which is still so poorly understood, the works in Prinzhorn’s collection provide more questions than answers (p. 46).”

(stop cycling through slides --- leave last one on)

Now we are done with hearing why the professionals were there, and what they were there to find. As I began, I told you that we would look at how the professionals framed that exhibition.  You may have thought I was using “frame” in the sense of the “picture-frame” (not an unreasonable assumption)---but in fact I was thinking of “frame” more in the sense of a “door-frame.”  “Door-frame” pulls us back to Michael Parsons’ comment on the “socially and historically constructed” sense of reality.  Gershon J. Molad (2001) has proposed “the door-frame” as a way to explain a change of inner orientation in the psychoanalyst (therapist) who moves from the private space of talking with an analysand (a patient) into the public space of a conference, to be talking with another analyst (therapist).  And in a way, many times this is true whenever we (not only therapists) move from talking privately to present our ideas in public. Molad looked at the increase in guardedness, in fearfulness, in conference space, and saw that we analysts and therapists behave as though the analytic frame contains a door.  Sometimes we are able to talk more openly on one side of the “door frame,” and, as he says, we use concepts of “ethics” and “identity” to defend ourselves as we move to present our case on the other side.  It looks as though passage through that door frame alters, shifts, or even negates the responsibility to hold our own and the other’s autobiography, his and our trauma.  That responsibility-to-hold, which is to recognize and respect our own and the other’s trauma, which is automatically assumed to be present with a patient, seems to disappear or be disavowed when we are with other analysts and therapists. 

Molad senses that we are in fear of re-traumatization by the exposure of cracks in our carefully constructed identity, and this fear renders the resulting conversation false, and re-traumatizing anyway.  (And then we will move from that inauthentic experience back into private, clinical space with the patient.  Do you think that there is no consequence for us of that divided consciousness? [Vida & Molad, 2001, in press]  How much do we acknowledge that we analysts and therapists forever carry our own traumas? Traumas are part of our human, indelible autobiography, whether we are therapists or not.) 

Molad thinks that the door frame is an illusion that we have constructed for our use, to excuse ourselves from recognizing the defensiveness of our manner of speaking with one another, which comes solely from the fear of re-traumatization.  It is an illusion that makes a certain kind of mark, he says, and these are his words, it is “part of a packing-box, which bounds the arrested development of the analyst (p. 98).” 

I am telling you about this because I think that the way the professionals framed that exhibition was another kind of illusionary door frame, to convey an illusion of safety to us, the public, that these works are about them --- the dead mental patients of the beginning of the century --- and not about us. If it is about them, then we can talk about “diagnosis,” and “this illness” and “psychosis” and “institutionalization,” and  “therapy” and “exploitation” and “is it really art?”  If it is about them, we can avoid a little longer thinking about why we went to see it, or about what interests us today.

I want to show you some slides of a piece now by a young Dutch sculptor, Merijn Bolink, whose work was on exhibition in Los Angeles at a gallery by coincidence at the same time as the Prinzhorn exhibition. Bolink, though he may not have known it, agreed with Molad that the door frame is an illusion, that opening-up (to life, to oneself, to another) is an entirely different procedure than passing through a frame. (slides --- Carousel I)  

Bolink found an old door, constructed of many pieces.  He took it apart piece by piece and then sliced each piece longitudinally, like a bagel. He then reassembled the door, but in two separate parts, each part being half (a longitudinal half) of the door. As you can see the door stands by itself, without a frame. It is vulnerable, but stable.  This is a remarkable picture of a state I have referred to previously as “cracked-open.”  We are “cracked-open” when being in touch with our difficult personal circumstances, past or current, gives us a rare, undefended permeability to new experiences with others, including with art.  When we are “cracked-open,” we can find the way in.  

A “way-in” to this exhibition could have come with thinking about why we were there, namely, “why did we come to this exhibition, you, and I?  What was it that drew us?” And today, let us think together about why we are here, about why I have come from Los Angeles to bring this to you, and why you are here listening to me. I think that whoever we are, whatever our professions, or if we think we have none, at heart our reasons for being here must be personal.  The personal is about our autobiography, about who we think we have been, who we are and are not.  In the sense of our personal story, the question of why we are here is not unusual. It is a question that is legitimate, and possibly interesting, and even necessary to ask of ourselves, why we are at any exhibition, at any place, with any one.  

It is a question that is there, whether we hear it or not, when we see this watercolor by Clemens von Oertzen (Viktor Orth). (slide --- Carousel I)   

What do we see?  What do we think? What do we feel?  Do we say anything to the person sitting next to us, who may have accompanied us or who may be a stranger?  Do we say anything to ourselves? Do I say to myself that this is only about him, the artist, the patient, and say (for example), Oh, look, there is this blue swath, it looks like water, is it a river? Is he being “swept along?” Is this about feeling that he is drowning?    Or do I stop for a while, and feel the immensity of that heavy blue swerving color, and see what looks like a body swept along, arm(s) and leg(s) akimbo, perhaps even disconnected, past an impervious structure on the bank, and think, oh, this feels like me, this is me, drowning in grief, and unable to get my bearings?  Do I say to the person sitting next to me, my colleague, or friend, or a stranger, “you know what? My dear friend just died, and this is so much what it feels like, being carried along by an undertow of grief, unhinged in time and space, and nothing makes any sense.”    

And then, what will that person say, or do? Will he turn away physically, made uncomfortable by such an inappropriately personal remark? Will he turn away emotionally, changing the subject, or saying something dismissive, or diminishing?  Perhaps he has his own personal grief that I have just intruded upon and he still needs to be alone with it. But if he says, “Yes, that is so, it brings to mind my own experience, when my father died, or when the house burned down, or what it has felt like since September 11th…” then there is a meeting.  It is an unlikely meeting perhaps, a meeting that lasts for a moment, the moment of that exchange of personal stories, if ever so brief, or a meeting that opens out into a longer, deeper relation, one that existed before or will exist after, but it is a meeting nonetheless.  Something has happened.  Something has happened in this instant that makes me more real to myself, and makes another more real to me, “another” being both the artist (the maker of the work) and the person with whom I have spoken. I have found a “missing part.” I am bigger on the inside to myself. I take up more room.  I am alive.   

It is this, this supposedly hypothetical encounter, that is the real subject of this talk.  I invite you to accompany me as I move in to a broader and deeper, and more personal way to think about this.  I wonder if, in this shared experience, in this commonality of being together in the same space, we can find some possibility of meeting each other, to make this meeting (ours with the works I am showing you, ours with this lecture, ours with one another), in Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger’s language, more of a sinthome than a symptom  --- more of an experience that exists in difficulty and therefore transcends it.  

There is a real difficulty now embedded in the unfolding autobiography of this lecture, a real “missing part,” unwittingly contributed by me, when I discovered later in the day that I arrived in Israel that I had not brought all the slides with me, that I had left the slides of the “open door” in my desk at home. It was necessary for my husband in Los Angeles to scan the slides into the computer, to print them out in Israel , and then to have some new slides made (which are not the slides that you just saw; you saw the originals). This was a complicated series of actions that was by no means easy to accomplish and required the unusual efforts of several people --- my husband, my friend and colleague Gersh Molad, his brother and his brother’s wife. Only with their help, their participation, was it possible to appear to restore that “missing part,” but it is important to recognize that it was only a copy, only a representation of what was lost, what was left behind, that I had to show on that evening in Haifa . That evening in Haifa was only three days before the first suicide bombing happened in the city that had previously been thought of as immunized from the Palestinian - Israeli conflict. (I would much rather remember only the mongoose that ran across the road as I was being driven into the city.)  It is important to acknowledge that what is lost leaves a mark, but most of the time we can not know it is there unless someone tells us.  

And there is yet another “missing part” now attached to this lecture, and it is about Detroit , where we are meeting today. I was born in Detroit , at Grace Hospital , during the Second World War. My mother had returned to live with her parents to give birth while my father was serving as a flight surgeon in the Pacific Theatre. I was 2 ½ years old when my gratefully reunited parents scooped me up and took me briefly to California , but my mother came back with me to Detroit for another six months until my father found a place for us to live. Since the age of three, except for some brief visits scattered over the intervening years and despite a large extended family that persisted here for some time, I’ve been quite disconnected from this place. My last visit was more than thirty years ago, when I was newly married and my husband and I came to Detroit to “make the rounds.” This is neither a surprising nor unusual story for an American of my generation, and especially not for a “Californian.” But there is another flavor to be stirred in. My grandparents, on both sides, were Hungarian immigrants, and my parents grew up speaking Hungarian in Del Ray, a Hungarian neighborhood, and met at Southwestern High School . Although the story I heard from my mother throughout my childhood (and had no reason not to accept) was that I had never learned or used Hungarian, I was astonished on a first trip to Hungary in 1993 to have a rudimentary baby-Hungarian erupt from unconsciousness, and suddenly all that I thought I knew of my earliest life was thrown into disarray. Each time I’ve gone back to Hungary I am amazed by the effect on me of being surrounded by the Hungarian language. My mother insists that this cannot be true, that this is “false memory syndrome.”  She had no sense of the immensity of my attachment to my grandparents (and I was not permitted to have perception different from hers). Nevertheless I have been putting together a picture of my earliest years that is quite different from what I had been so insistently told. So this is my first visit back here to Detroit since my larger story has emerged, and I know it will take a while before the experience of it settles in.  

I realize at this moment, with a smile, that the very nature of what I am saying --- that a conversation in which “communication” (the transfer of information) is less the goal than for both of us to feel understood --- begins to sound rather like what the words of Inge Jadi and of Caroline Douglas described as “art-therapy”. (In thinking about the art-therapist who brings experience and knowledge into contact with the patient who would feel understood, neither Inge Jadi nor Caroline Douglas considered what it might be like for the therapist. Neither considered that coming into contact with the intimate world of the so-called patient could allow the therapist, also, to feel “understood,” and that that might matter.)  

I’ve been talking to you now for some minutes (it may seem longer). Who else am I, anyway? In fact my autobiography has been smeared all over what I’ve saying, but you can’t begin to know that unless you knew me before, or --- also --- unless I tell you.  

First of all, you should know that my husband and I have collected contemporary art since 1972. We didn’t think of it as “collecting” --- it was just that there were these pieces we came upon that we knew we didn’t want to live without.  We didn’t think much about what it was we were doing for quite a while, but at a certain point we started to notice that most of the works we were drawn to were made with some sense of personal necessity, conscious or unconscious, intentional or not, by the artists.  Eventually, we admitted that the works we were drawn to felt like pieces of ourselves, that they revealed to us pieces of ourselves that we hadn’t known about before.  Needless to say, not all these works were pretty and nice. Finally, we came to understand that, taken all together, the works we had collected were tantamount to a portrait of us, a self portrait, if you privilege the acts of collecting and selecting as something creative in itself.  This is an experience of art that is at the opposite end of the continuum from art therapy; it is using someone’s else’s art (or artistic production) as a kind of therapy, if by “therapy” we are continuing to mean “that which allows us to reach a deeper self-understanding.”  

Two things happened from this. First is that, decades ago, as a developing psychoanalyst, I realized that what I was learning about myself (and others) from art was not what I was learning in my psychoanalytic training. The lessons from art were either different, or contradictory. These differences pointed to aspects of my training about which I had long been secretly doubtful.  It took me a long time, though, to risk talking openly about this, which I started to do in 1995, in a lecture titled “Life Lessons: What One Psychoanalyst Learned From Contemporary Art,” a lecture I have now given numerous times, to both psychoanalytic and art-oriented audiences. People usually laugh when I say this, but it is not a joke that the secret, real title of that lecture is “ Everything I learned about psychoanalysis that matters I learned from contemporary art.”    

Another thing that happened is that I began to be invited to talk more directly to art audiences from this strange perspective of the psychoanalyst who has been taught by art. It was in 1998 that, as I already mentioned, I first spoke about the artist Yayoi Kusama who lives voluntarily on the grounds of a psychiatric hospital in Japan .  In that lecture I argued against a reading of her work as psychopathology, the consequence of mental illness.  In the work of psychoanalysts John Gedo, Thomas Szasz, and Sándor Ferenczi, I’ve found confirmation and company for some basic ideas about creativity that I’ve been thinking about for over twenty years. [And I want to say just a word about Ferenczi, who died in 1933 at the age of 59. Sigmund Freud is well known as the inventor of psychoanalysis.  Ferenczi, less well-known, was one of the pioneering generation of psychoanalysts.  Freud came to realize that his primary interest was in psychoanalysis as an intellectual system, a universal theory of mind.  It is striking that almost all of Freud’s theories have been undermined by accumulating contemporary research in the neurosciences.  Ferenczi, on the other hand, was devoted to developing psychoanalysis as a therapy, to relieve suffering, and to address the consequences of severe trauma. Almost all of Ferenczi’s work has turned out to be profoundly prophetic of the contemporary understanding of the therapeutic relationship, and of trauma, to which the field is only now beginning to catch-up. And his work is proving to be congruent with both neuroscience and attachment research.]   

In 1999, when I spoke about the work of the artist Charles Ray, I gave a condensed version of my basic premises, which I have gone on to modify slightly:

1.      The creative capacity is inborn (although its relative strength or quantity or quality varies widely from person to person. Not everyone is “an” artist, yet we could say that each of us is “the” artist, in the sense of “creator,” of our own life).

2.      This creative capacity undergoes its own (autonomous) development as it is tested and made use of, over a lifetime. People are often unaware that they are using that creative capacity in responding to life exigencies.

3.      Harsh circumstances both personal and historical can squelch, deform, or destroy that creative capacity; conversely, favorable circumstances may encourage it to thrive.  Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between circumstances that are “harsh” and circumstances that are “favorable.”

4.      So-called “madness” does not generate creative activity, nor is creativity a consequence of it. 

5.      The artist has an unusually sensitive and/or unusually open perceptual apparatus and will experience a different quantity and quality of suffering than a person in the middle of the bell-shaped curve.

6.      I view art fundamentally as the artist’s effort first to articulate and then to communicate what he (or she, of course) experiences and perceives, intellectually as well as visually. Here I am using the word “communicate” differently than did Dr. Inge Jadi and Caroline Douglas.  I am using it specifically to indicate a dialogue, a conversation which is initiated by the artist and which will go on inside the viewer, with the viewer’s idea of the artist, perhaps with others in the viewer’s circle, and most hopefully, with himself. (Originally, trying to be modest in my claim, I had written this that I view much contemporary art as the artist’s effort to articulate and communicate his experience and perception, but more and more I’m thinking that this is true of art-making activity in general.)  

As a psychoanalyst and as one whose life has been changed by these intense encounters with other people’s art, my perspective is not based on identifying pathology ---and with the word “pathology” I am pointing to the simplistic dichotomy of “sick” and “healthy.”  Instead I look to art and the artist’s experiences and devices to inform a larger understanding of the human condition, mine, and yours.

Understanding the human condition evolves into talking further about that which is not there, the missing part of what is ourselves.  As my husband and I discovered, one way to search for “the missing part” is to use art (or artistic production), one’s own (or another’s), as an agent of discovery.  “Conversation” is another.  But the big problem of the missing part(s) is that awareness of it makes us anxious, very anxious.   What is “the missing part?”  “The missing part” is the part, or parts, of us, that go into hiding, or disappear, or seem to be dead in response to some kind of trauma, or intense unmasterable difficulty. The trauma, the “what” of what happened, is our history, our autobiography. When we meet one another, in “external-social reality” (Molad, 2001), we try to act as though our history never happened. We construct an identity of a small selection of bits of ourselves, trying to keep hidden the injured parts, and hoping that the other will accept the constructed identity at face value, and not to think less of us for our inexorable vulnerabilities.  The other does the same.  It is a two-dimensional way of relating, the ordinary, socially-correct way of relating , and it can look quite beautiful, and it works, up to a point. (without comment, show slide of Molad’s painting, "V. Conversation, talk, lecture, therapy, discourse: 1. Surface of things” --- Carousel I)

The “point” is that we are after all three-dimensional beings even though we may walk around, and converse, as though there are only two.  I think we are rather like icebergs, with so much submerged below the surface. Bumping up against the submerged parts is inevitable. This bumping-up touches, bruises, re-injures the already-injured parts.  We react in strange, hurtful, or withdrawing ways, a trouble and a consternation, and the other may do the same. With real friends, we find some ways to repair, to bridge, perhaps even to go on growing, to use one another’s helpful responses to resume our development, in a three- rather than a two-dimensional way. With family, we sometimes can do the same, but family icebergs tend to be bigger, older, stretching back for generations, the injuries can be greater and more frightening to deal with, more of a life-and-death matter, so that sometimes there is repair and growth but more commonly there is a sealing-over, making-do and getting-by with one another.  And then, of course, our enemies will always find ways to exploit, to make use of for their own purposes, our vulnerabilities.  

Here is another picture (slide of Molad’s second painting: "V. Conversation, talk, lecture, therapy, discourse: 2. The things [partial structure]” --- Carousel I), which moves beyond the initial two-dimensional representation to show you how this works, that demonstrates the relation between the two- and the three-dimensionalities, and the possibilities for interaction: making possible “the meeting of external-conventional conversation and internal dialogue (Molad & Vida, 082800).” (slide of Molad’s second painting: "V. Conversation, talk, lecture, therapy, discourse: 2. The things [partial structure]")  

“A long time ago,” wrote Gershon Molad, whose paintings these are, “I was less imaginative and thought, by mistake, that there is a possible conversation between Therapist, Patient, and Another-person, supervisor, another therapist/analyst, any A, what they call the other third, one that makes---or wishe[s,] as an enabling factor ---the conversation [to keep] going (or … kills it).  Or is A a sign for Another possible dialogue…” ( Molad & Vida, 090300 ) That “other third,” that “Another person,” is who we long for when we, the icebergs, enter into one another’s territory. When viewed at the surface level, it is a something (or someone)-in-between, to make some space for the underneath parts not to bang in to each other, and possibly, even, to be discovered, to be allowed to un-submerge.  

This second painting shows the move from two- to three-dimensional conversation, with the operation of “the other third.” A conversation, any conversation, is fundamentally three-dimensional, but so often it is treated as though there are only two.  Where this connects to the matter at hand is a use of art as the “other third,” on the way to wishing, or making, or killing a conversation in which our own development can resume. There is danger, here, and the danger is embodied in the painting by a seemingly “misplaced” line, a “mistake,” depicting a conversation that started and then had to turn back, to stop.  Molad refers to this as “the nature of a conversation, born out of mistakes, [and] failures.” In search of safety and protection, we want to deny mistakes, fearful of the negation, the refusal that is always there between us, a potential, in any conversation. “The double-repeated structure, a measure of strength, contains [and holds] the ‘mistake.’” It is the conversation interrupted, un-received, refused, and when it happens, “the perspective changes, and it is not clear any more whose position it is, and if possible at all (Molad & Vida, 090300).”  

These two paintings of Molad’s, particularly the one with the “mistake,” offer a way to look at, or think about, the works in the Prinzhorn exhibition, works made by those whose lives turned upside-down in extreme ways, who had their submerged portions up-ended, exposed and stranded, and bumping-up is all they were able to do, and it was something from which they (and others) seemingly needed to be protected, so they were in the asylum. Perhaps contemporary explanations of psychosis would hold that solely within the minds of these patients were generated the negations, were the repudiations of dimensionality. Nevertheless, these works of theirs (which Prinzhorn was careful to call “artistic productions” rather than “art”) can be part of a dialogue, perhaps not, as it turned out, with people in their surroundings, if we can believe the accounts of their incarceration, but with us.  We are the ghostly completion of the third dimension for them, and perhaps they can be, for us. (And if the three-dimensionality of our conversation is thwarted, is only negated and refused, then a part of us, perhaps even a very large part of us, is driven to the asylum as well.)   

So far, this by-way-of-explanation is talking about a T, a P, and an A as though they are three separate people. But really, as we think some more about this, it becomes clear that the T, the P, and the A are also all parts of ourselves, parts of our one-self.  In some respects they characterize the iceberg, and they are different ways of relating closer to the surface, mediating between the levels as we talk to ourselves.  

“Each of us is many persons.”  Each of these “inmates,” stripped by illness and circumstance of everyday identity and attributes (except as noted in old, archived, patient records), nevertheless had sufficient “self” persisting (surviving) to make these works. These are works made by “what” is left, by “who” is left.  It is a story basically similar to that of Dr. William Chester Minor, who during his decades as an inmate in Broadmoor Asylum for the Insane was nevertheless one of the most important contributors to the creation of the Oxford English Dictionary.  In a recent best-selling book ( Winchester , 1998), he was described as an adult-onset paranoid schizophrenic, incarcerated for a murder committed while in the grips of psychotic delusion.          

“Each of us is many persons.”  Each of us, a T, a P, and an A, puts one or more parts into conversation with one another, whose T, or P, or A may or may not be readily distinguished. I want to say some more about this matter of being many persons because leaving it with the inmates of the asylum may suggest that I think that “many persons” refers to the sick and the well, that I am talking about sick parts and well parts. This is the point at which two basic ideas meet, the idea of “missing parts” and the idea of “many persons,” and discover that they are twins. Each lends a larger understanding to the other.  I will call on Fernando Pessoa to help me out, to be an “A.” 

Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935), writes Alfred Mac Adam, “is Portugal ’s major twentieth century writer, its greatest representative of the modern sensibility.”[1] Pessoa is best known as a poet “who decided to become a poetic generation unto himself by writing under pseudonyms he called ‘heteronyms (p. vii).’” These “heteronyms” had the characteristics of complete personalities, with names, histories, and unfolding life stories that both did and did not resemble Pessoa’s own.  One of them, “Alberto Caeiro,” was an earthy unlettered man, a “pure mystic (p. 39);” another, “Ricardo Reis,” was an ethereal classicist of profound sadness ( p.96); a third,  “Alvaro de Campos,”  was “the ideal poet engineer,” a sensationalist (p. 142).  There were others, there were even many others. There was a heteronym named “Fernando Pessoa,” who was, in Richard Zenith’s language, “the mask behind the man (p. 213).”  Another great poet, Octavio Paz, explained it like this:  

“His secret…is written in his name: Pessoa means person in Portuguese and comes from persona, the mask worn by Roman actors.  Mask, character from fiction, no one: Pessoa.  His story could be reduced to the passage between the unreality of his daily life and the reality of his fictions (p. vii).”  

Earlier we heard the professionals telling us that one must have a self in order to make art. But Fernando Pessoa’s creative mission was the repudiation of being a self. Perhaps his multilingual, bi-continental early life gives a small amount of autobiographical justification for this extreme position, but it doesn’t explain it.  Fernando Pessoa refused to be some “one” in order to be no one; it was in a sense to protect being no one, that he became “some one(s).”  And in so doing, he illuminated something universal that we are scarcely ever able to notice, and if we do notice, it is even more difficult to bear. Fernando Pessoa maintained a distance from life that at one and the same time held life in the most intimate of embraces (another sinthome, perhaps). For example,    

“I am a keeper of herds,” he wrote as the unlettered mystic, “Alberto Caeiro.”

            The herd is my thoughts

            And my thoughts are all sensations.

            I think with my eyes and my ears

            And with my hands and feet

            And with my nose and mouth.

            To think a flower is to see it and smell it

            And to eat a piece of fruit is to know its meaning.

            That’s why when on a hot day

            I grieve for having enjoyed it so much,

            I stretch out on the grass,

            And I close my hot eyes,

            I feel my whole body sprawled on reality,

            I know the truth and I am happy.

                                                (trans. Alfred Mac Adam)

 Fernando Pessoa took an extreme, unflinching approach to this being-of-many-persons. His was the simultaneous embrace of the elements of conversation we have identified as safety/protection and negation.  What he demonstrates is that living in the presence of this simultaneity can be difficult to distinguish, in one’s own private space, from something like madness. (while reading poems, cycle again through Prinzhorn slides --- Carousel II --- slowly, but back and forth if need be. And then bring up Clemens  van Oertzen as well --- Carousel I --- and leave it on.)

From THIS OLD ANGUISH (“Alvaro de Campos”)

 …If at least I could be positively crazy!

But no: always this in-betweenness,

This almost,

This it might be that…

This.

 An inmate in an insane asylum is at least someone.

I’m an inmate in an asylum without an asylum.

I’m consciously crazy,

I’m a lucid lunatic,

I’m alien to everything and equal to all:

I’m sleeping while awake with dreams that are madness

Because they’re not dreams…

 

I’M BEGINNING TO KNOW MYSELF.  I DON’T EXIST (“Alvaro de Campos”)

 I’m beginning to know myself.  I don’t exist.

I’m the gap between what I’d like to be and what others have made me,

Or half of this gap, since there’s also life…

That’s me.  Period.

Turn off the light, shut the door, and get rid of the slipper noise in the hallway.

Leave me alone in my room with the vast peace of myself.

It’s a shoddy universe.

“I’m having one of those days in which I never had a future,” he wrote, in a letter over his own name, to a friend who would soon commit suicide. “There is only a present, fixed and surrounded by a wall of anguish.  The other bank of the river, because it is the other bank, is never the bank we are standing on: that is the intimate reason for all my suffering. There are ships sailing to many ports, but not a single one goes where life is not painful; nor is there any port of call where it is possible to forget (p. xxv, trans. A. Mac Adam).”  

 

THIS  SPECIES OF MADNESS (“Fernando Pessoa”)

 This species of madness

Which isn’t just cleverness

And which shines in the darkness

Of my muddled intelligence

 Doesn’t bring me happiness.

There is always, in the city,

Either clear or cloudy skies,

But in me I don’t know what there is.

 

I’M SORRY I DON’T RESPOND (“Fernando Pessoa”)

 I’m sorry I don’t respond

But it isn’t, after all, my fault

That I don’t correspond

To the other you loved in me.

 Each of us is many persons.

To me I’m who I think I am,

But others see me differently

And are equally mistaken.

 Don’t dream me into someone else

But leave me alone, in peace!

If I don’t want to find myself,

Should I want others to find me?

26 August 1930

 

 (“Alberto Caeiro”)…The river of my village doesn’t make you think of anything… (p. xv, trans. Alfred Mac Adam)  

In Pessoa’s prose diary, The Book of Disquiet, originally written under yet another heteronym, Bernardo Soares, we read, “ In these disconnected impressions, which I deliberately leave disconnected, I shall narrate my autobiography in an indifferent sort of way, without facts; my history without life (p. 6).”  These Prinzhorn drawings, disconnected from their makers, are the narrations of autobiographies indifferently presented, without history, but with a strange, persistent life. And here we are, together in this room, I disconnected from you, you from me and perhaps from one another, and to a certain extent we may be disconnected from ourselves. Yet here we are, in spite of disconnection, perhaps even in defiance of disconnection. Are we searching for ourselves in one part of this story and another?  Can we locate some part of the story in us?  Can we see one another here, too?

 And so, why are we here?[2]

 (Except where noted, all translations are by Richard Zenith.)

 References

Bolink, M. (2000). Open Door.  In: Solo Exhibition, August 11- September 23, 2000 . POST, Los Angeles , 1904 East 7th Place , Los Angeles , CA , 90021 ; (213) 622-8580.

De Zegher, C. (2000). A subterranean chapter of twentieth-century art history.  In: The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock.  New York : The Drawing Center , pp. 3-8.

Douglas, C. (1996). Precious and splendid fossils.  In: Beyond Reason: Art and Psychosis.  Works from the Prinzhorn Collection.  Berkeley , Los Angeles , London : University of California Press,  pp. 35-47.

Ettinger, B. L. (2000). Some-event and some-encounter between sinthome and symptom.  In:  The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock.   New York :  The Drawing Center , pp. 61-75.  

Foster, H. (2000). “No man’s land”: On the modernist reception of the art of the insane. In: The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock.  New York : The Drawing Center , pp. 9-24.  

Gilman, S. (2000). The mad as artists.  In: The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock.  New York : The Drawing Center , pp. 25-42.  

Jadi, I. (1996). Points of view---perspectives---horizons.  In : Beyond Reason: Art and Psychosis.  Works from the Prinzhorn Collection.  Berkeley , Los Angeles , London : University of California Press,  pp. 24-34.  

Mac Adam, A. (1998). Introduction. In: Pessoa, F., The Book of Disquiet, composed by Bernardo Soares, assistant bookkeeper in the city of Lisbon . Boston : Exact Change, pp. vii-xxii.  

Molad, G.J. (1994). A proposal for a possible conversation (II Draft). Staff Meeting, 6 December.  

Molad, G. J. (2001). On presenting one’s case: Embraced trauma and the dialogue between analysts. The Psychoanalytic Review: 95-111.  

Molad, G.J. & Vida, J.E. (2000).  Correspondence.  

Parsons, M. (2000). Sexuality and perversion a hundred years on: discovering what Freud discovered. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81: 37-51.  

Pessoa, F. (1998). The Book of Disquiet, composed by Bernardo Soares, assistant bookkeeper in the city of Lisbon . Trans. A. Mac Adam. Boston : Exact Change.  

Pessoa, F . (1998). Fernando Pessoa & Co. Selected Poems. Ed. and trans. from the Portuguese Richard Zenith.  New York : Grove Press.  

Tausk, V. (1919). On the origin of the “influencing machine” in schizophrenia.  In: Sexuality, War, and Schizophrenia. Collected Psychoanalytic Papers of Victor Tausk. Ed. and intro. P. Roazen. Trans. E. Mosbacher, et al. New Brunswick ( U.S.A. ) & London ( U.K. ): Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp. 185-219.  

Vida, J. E. (1998). Living art: assaulting the myths of art and illness. Lecture, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles , CA , May 14, 1998 ; Walker Art Center , Minneapolis , MN , February 28, 1999 , and to International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education, annual meeting, November 3-5, 2000 , Chicago IL .  

Vida, J. E. (1999). A foot in the door: some remarks about Charles Ray.  Lecture, Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles , CA , January 10, 1999 .  

Vida, J.E. & Molad, G.J. (2001, in press). The Ferenczian dialogue: psychoanalysis as a way of life. Presented to “The Lost Childhood,” organized by The Sándor Ferenczi Society of Budapest , February 25. As “Le dialogue ferenczien (J. Dupont, Trans.), in Le Coq-Heron, 107: 28-36, 2001, and in press, conference proceedings. An earlier version, “The psychoanalysis that is (a way of) life: the Ferenczi-experience” was presented (by JEV) to “Evolution and Revolutions in Psychoanalysis: 100 Years Since Freud,” a program sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis in association with the Los Angeles County Psychological Association, in conjunction with the exhibit “Freud: Conflict and Culture” at the HUC-Skirball Cultural Center, Los Angeles, CA, April 15, 2000.  

Weiss, A. (2000). Prinzhorn’s heterotopia.  In The Prinzhorn Collection: Traces upon the Wunderblock.  New York : The Drawing Center , pp. 43-60.  

Winchester , S. (1998). The Professor and the Madman. New York : HarperCollins

Zenith, R. (1998).  Introduction (pp. 1-36) and commentaries ( p. 39-41; 95-97; 141-142; 215-218). In: Fernando Pessoa & Co. Selected Poems. Ed. and trans. from the Portuguese, Richard Zenith.  New York : Grove Press.  

Slides

Carousel 1

1.      Merijn Bolink, Open Door. Installation view. Solo exhibition, 2000. POST, 1904 East 7th Place , Los Angeles CA 90021 ; 213-622-8580.

2.      Merijn Bolink, Open Door. Installation view. Solo exhibition, 2000. POST, 1904 East 7th Place , Los Angeles CA 90021 ; 213-622-8580.

3.      Merijn Bolink, Open Door. Installation view. Solo exhibition, 2000. POST, 1904 East 7th Place , Los Angeles CA 90021 ; 213-622-8580.

4.      Merijn Bolink, Open Door (detail). Installation view. Solo exhibition, 2000. POST, 1904 East 7th Place , Los Angeles CA 90021 ; 213-622-8580.

5.      Gershon J. Molad, V. Conversation, talk, lecture, therapy, discourse: 1. Surface of things. Ink on paper.  From: A proposal for a possible conversation ( II Draft). Staff Meeting, 6 December, 1994 .

6.      Gershon J. Molad, V. Conversation, talk, lecture, therapy, discourse: 2. The things (partial structure). Ink on paper.  From: A proposal for a possible conversation ( II Draft). Staff Meeting, 6 December, 1994 .

7.      Clemens von Oertzen (Viktor Orth). Untitled, 1900-1919. Pencil, watercolors, on drawing paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

  Carousel 2 (in no particular order)

1. Emma Bachmayer. Untitled,  1912. Pen on paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of    Heidelberg .

2.         Karl Gustav Sievers.  Untitled, n.d. Pencil, watercolors, on flimsy. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

3.         Friedrich Bedurftig.  The Scaffolding of Water: Automobile on Water and on Land, (Das Gerust des Wasser: Automobil zu Wasser und zu Lande) 1913.  Pencil on card. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

4.         Stefan Klojer.  (Title illegible), 1898.  Pencil on drawing paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

5.         Else Blankenhorn.  Untitled, n.d.  Oil on canvas. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

6.         Oskar Herzberg.  Untitled, n.d.  Pencil on paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

7.         Emma Hauk.  Letter to Husband,  1909. Pencil on paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

8.         Louis Castner.  ‘1920’, 1920. Pencil, indelible pencil, colored pencil on paper (double leaf). The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

9.         Josef Forster. Untitled, after 1916. Mixed media on cardboard. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

10.    Rudolf Heinrichshofen. Handmade book of picture stories on current events with illustrated autobiography, c. 1919. Mixed media. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

11.     Rudolf Heinrichshofen. Handmade book of picture stories on current events with illustrated autobiography, c. 1919. Mixed media. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

12.     Franz Karl Buhler (Pohl). Untitled, n.d. Pastels, stumped chalk, on drawing paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

13.     Josef Heinrich Grebing. Colour Chart, n.d. Pen, body colors, on artists’ board. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

14.     Josef Heinrich Grebing.  Untitled, n.d. Pen on paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

15.     August Klett (Klotz). Untitled, 1915. Pencil, watercolors, colored pencil, on writing paper. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

16.     August Natterer (Neter). The miraculous shepherd (II) (‘Wunder-Hirthe’ II), before 1919. Pencil, watercolors, on watercolor board, varnished, mounted on gray cardboard. The Prinzhorn Collection, University of Heidelberg .

Judith E. Vida, M.D.

301 S. Fair Oaks Avenue

Suite 406A

Pasadena , CA 91105

Tel: 626-796-7572

e-mail: jvida@spence.net  

 

[1] In Haifa , I mentioned that two books of Pessoa’s were so far available in Hebrew translation: Th